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of national cultural values on decisions related to
employee training and development. Investigating
this and other possibilities remains an important
challenge for future research.
Source: Peretz, H., & Rosenblatt, Z. (2011). The role of
societal cultural practices in organizational investment in
training: A comparative study in 21 countries. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42(5), 817–831.
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It’s a nightmare most companies would prefer notto face. A high-potential executive beinggroomed for senior management is rotated
through various assignments with progressively
higher responsibilities. After being named country
manager in a high-growth market, the executive
suddenly resigns to work for a major competitor.
Millions of dollars invested in the employee are
lost, and the firm struggles to find a replacement.
Even worse is that walking out the door with the
departing manager are deep knowledge about firm
operations, future product plans, market entry
strategies, and relationships with local officials.
When facing such a situation, firms may re-
spond by attempting to keep the departing exec-
utive with higher pay and bigger bonuses. But
some companies lack deep pockets, and some
managers may not be seduced by money. Conse-
quently, companies may resort to litigation to
recoup the costs they incur when important exec-
utives depart. So it should come as no surprise that
many firms have enthusiastically embraced “non-
compete agreements” in recent years as a way to
deal with executive departures. In brief, noncom-
petes restrict executive behavior post-employ-
ment, specifically prohibiting the executive from
working for a competitor after leaving the firm.
Noncompetes are highly variable, but typically
include a provision for when they kick in (some
apply whenever employees leave, while others ap-
ply only if employees leave voluntarily), how long
they apply (most last for two or three years), and
where they apply (some apply just to areas where
the old firm competes, while others cover larger
territories). Courts and legislatures have expressed
concern that noncompetes might limit someone’s
ability to earn a living. In legal terms, noncom-
petes occupy strange ground—covenants not to
compete are usually indicative of monopolistic
tendencies and are generally prohibited. But when
employing executives, firms believe that extract-
ing a noncompete is critical for protecting their
investments.
However, a fascinating new study by Mark Gar-
maise (UCLA) throws that belief into doubt. It
suggests that firms using noncompetes may actu-
ally keep vital talent from flowing into the com-
pany rather than the reverse. Garmaise examined
the effects of noncompetes in various states be-
cause contract law is determined on a state-by-
state basis. Pro-employer states permit noncom-
petes broadly, while pro-worker states don’t
recognize noncompetes. Some states have evolved
their approaches as legislatures respond to judicial
decisions interpreting noncompetes. Using a da-
tabase of executive compensation, Garmaise
found that noncompetes are indeed popular, with
more than 70% of reporting firms requiring some
form of noncompete. Even in states such as Cal-
ifornia where noncompetes are virtually unen-
forced by the law, more than half of firms report
requiring noncompetes, a testament to their se-
ductive allure, ignorance of the law, or both.
Garmaise’s findings contain good news and
(more) bad news for firms employing noncom-
petes. On one hand, his study confirms the notion
that when states enforce noncompetes, executive
turnover is lower and job tenures longer. Firms in
high-enforcement states also tend to spend less in
capital expenditures per employee and pay exec-
utives less, with a greater chunk of compensation
coming from base salary. And when executives in
these states do move to other firms, they receive
smaller pay increases and assume lower ranked
positions, at least compared to executives in states
where noncompetes aren’t strongly enforced. Em-
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ployer concerns about being sued in these high-
enforcement jurisdictions may lead to greater ne-
gotiation power with the departing executive.
Less employee turnover, more executive stabil-
ity, lower capital expenditures, and less upward
pressure on compensation would appear to be
good news for firms using noncompetes. But Gar-
maise found surprising effects when firms use non-
competes in high-enforcement states. For starters,
consider the shift toward salary as a percentage of
total compensation in these states. As human
resource managers know, tying executive compen-
sation to non-salary metrics such as firm perfor-
mance or share price can be an excellent tool for
motivating behavior that supports the firm’s stra-
tegic objectives. Indeed, Garmaise found that
maintaining managers’ exposure to the firm’s
stock price through the use of stock options was
less important in high-enforcement states.
Ironically, the study also suggests that execu-
tive quality suffers when firms use noncompetes in
high-enforcement states—the very thing that
noncompetes are supposedly designed to avoid.
Garmaise found that while noncompetes bind ex-
ecutives to firms, in doing so they may be chang-
ing the quality of their leadership for the worse.
Working under a noncompete in a high-enforce-
ment state may cause executives to stop investing
in their own development because they are hand-
cuffed to their companies. For example, execu-
tives in these circumstances may have less moti-
vation to cultivate industry contacts or attend
important trade shows to stay on top of trends—
making them less effective over time. So as firms
tie employees to noncompetes, they may end up
hurting themselves by limiting the transferability
of talent, curbing executive motivation, and cre-
ating a stagnant labor pool internally.
Perhaps the worst news for firms is that enforc-
ing noncompetes appears to have no effect on
R&D investment—a primary reason for noncom-
petes in the first place. Firms in low-enforcement
jurisdictions should therefore be better suited to
make those R&D investments, a finding con-
firmed by comparing the computer industries in
California (low enforcement) and Massachusetts
(high enforcement). Scholars have long argued
that high knowledge spillovers in Silicon Valley
give it location-specific advantages. Garmaise’s
study suggests that public policy toward noncom-
petes plays a critical role in creating those loca-
tion-specific advantages. Finally, the study found
strong support for the conclusion that noncom-
petes have no significant effect on firm value or
profitability. Given that outcome, and the high
costs noncompetes exact on talent transfer and
labor flexibility, firms considering noncompetes
should proceed with caution.
Garmaise’s research offers implications for both
states and firms. For states seeking to attract in-
vestment, innovative companies, and well-paid
employees, enforcing noncompetes may ulti-
mately be counterproductive. For firms seeking to
protect their intellectual property and human cap-
ital, using noncompetes to restrict employee mo-
bility may backfire and result in a stagnant labor
pool. It would be interesting to know if similar
results hold true for other popular policies that
apply during employment terms, such as non-dis-
paragement and arbitration clauses. If they do, the
implications of Garmaise’s study will be broadly
felt in management practice for decades to come.
Source: Garmaise, M. J. (2011). Ties that truly bind: Non-
competition agreements, executive compensation, and firm
investment. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
27, 376–425.
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If leadership makes a difference, as many believe,we might expect leaders who display positivemoods to alter the attitudes of team members.
But what becomes of these changed attitudes?
There is a large body of research in the manage-
ment literature on “employee happiness” and
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